Four on an Anniversary + 2
Thanks to the
Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs I've come accross 4 essays on the subject of the tenth anniversary of Oslo. I'll save the best for last, so let's start with
Marwan Bishara identified as a "lecturer at the American University of Paris":
The lion’s share of the blame falls with the United States and Israel, whose actions in turn triggered violent reactions from the Palestinians.
This is like "stop me before I kill again." The PA resolved to settle all disputes through political means not violence ten years ago. It never actually followed that commitment. Violence wasn't a reaction triggered by Israeli actions; it was carefully orchestrated by the PA's leadership and excused by most of the world. The next paragraph actually is somewhat (and surprisingly) honest:
The United States failed to use its considerable influence to curb the expansionist impulses of the proponents of a Greater Israel, who slowly but steadily tore the spirit of Oslo to pieces.
That's right, the expansion of Jewish communities in Yesha and Azza was, at worst, a violation of the "spirit" of Oslo, never of the letter of Oslo, like the aforementioned violence was. (See more on this later.) The building or expanding of Jewish communities in the disputed areas was never mentioned, as
Yossi Beilin acknowledges in the next items:
First, the fact that no reference was made to the freezing of Israeli settlements in the West Bank and Gaza Strip — the Palestinians accepted Rabin’s personal commitment to halt the construction of new settlements — created an opening that a subsequent right-wing government used to build new settlements, though it clearly was not the original intent of the agreement.
Of course so many other details were specified in the Accords, it strains credulity to say that the expansion of a Jewish presence in the disputed areas was clearly meant to be prohibited by the accords. Then in the next paragraph Beilin shows himself to be a master of understatement:
Second, Israel did not give sufficient importance to incitement in the Palestinian media, thinking it was a trend that would pass when the final-status agreement was signed. This incitement played a significant role in the Palestinians’ return to violence in 2000.
First of all, I heard Beilin speak in 1996 and when someone asked about Palestinian incitement (and other violations of Oslo) he answered that Israel's violations were worse! But the incitement would have led nowhere if the PA didn't allow terrorist groups to organize and arm themselves two weeks before Likud leader Ariel Sharon visited Har Habayit (the Temple Mount). Earlier on, though, Beilin demonstrated his absolute blindness with a boast:
But the talks that I initiated in Oslo contained two unique elements: For the first time, the Palestinian partner was clearly identified as the PLO; and the idea was proposed to transfer to Palestinian control most of the Gaza Strip and the Jericho area even before elections were held for the Palestinian Authority’s legislative council and leadership.
Frankly, I can't understand why he's so proud. These are precisely the reasons that Oslo failed. It was predicated on legitimizing an unrepentant terrorist and then giving him a base of operations. It required no complaince or proof of good faith from a well known thug. Of course, Beilin claims only the purist of motives, to maintain Israel's status as a Jewish democratic state. Then why did he
sneak around making agreements with the PLO when it was illegal to do so and then present these agreements as a
fait accompli to Rabin? I can think of no more certain subversin of democracy than what Beilin did in the name of "peace."
Next up is
Dennis Ross. While his entry is not perfect, it shows a lot more clearheadedness than anything he demonstrated from 1993-2001.
Palestinians must know that there will be no Palestinian state born of violence; that terror will delegitimize their cause; that they will have to compromise on Jerusalem, borders, and refugees — indeed, that the solution on refugees must permit a two-state solution, not a one-state solution. Israel will be a Jewish state and Palestinians must be prepared to recognize it as such.
Throughout Oslo, preparation of publics was conspicuously absent, especially on the Palestinian side — where Arafat treated the very concept of compromise on the permanent status issues as a betrayal.
Third, Arab leaders must assume their responsibilities. The Arab role during Oslo was limited — in part because the Palestinians only sought their support but never their guidance; and in part because Arab leaders were fearful of being accused by Arafat asking the Palestinians to surrender their national rights if they pressed him to compromise on the core issues.
Dore Gold
gets to the heart of the matter and casts the problems of Oslo as intelligence failures:
Intelligence errors usually are associated with military disasters like Pearl Harbor or the 1973 Yom Kippur War, not with diplomacy.
Yet the last decade of the Israeli-Palestinian peace process may involve such an error of assessment. Looking back now, 10 years after the signing of the 1993 Oslo Accords, it’s clear that the failure to reach an Israeli-Palestinian agreement cannot be attributed to a lack of political will on the Israeli side or the failure of the United States to deal more forcibly with noncompliance.
Rather, it has to do with the more fundamental question of whether the leadership of the PLO really was prepared for reconciliation and peace with Israel.
The overwhelming evidence from statements by the PLO leadership was that it viewed the Oslo process as a tactical necessity to realize its ultimate strategic goal of recovering the entire territory of British Mandatory Palestine — including the area of Israel.
It would be a mistake to assign this intention to PLO leader Yasser Arafat alone. After all, it was the PLO’s top official for Jerusalem, Faisal Husseini, who on two separate occasions in 2001 described Oslo as a “Trojan Horse” that served the realization of “the strategic goal — namely, Palestine from the river to the sea.”
Similarly, the leader of the Fatah movement in the West Bank, Marwan Barghouti, told The New Yorker that even if Israel withdrew from 100 percent of the West Bank and Gaza Strip, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict would not end. What was needed, he said, was “one state for all the peoples.”
Now that we've covered all of the JTA articles that I can find, it's worth bringing two more opinions.
Daniel Pipes pretty much agrees with Dore Gold even if he doesn't refer to Oslo as an intelligence failure:
Many things, but most important was that the deal rested on a faulty Israeli premise that Palestinians had given up their hope of destroying the Jewish state. This led to the expectation that if Israel offered sufficient financial and political incentives, the Palestinians would formally recognize the Jewish state and close down the conflict.
Israelis therefore pushed themselves to make an array of concessions, in the futile hope that flexibility, restraint and generosity would win Palestinian goodwill. In fact, these steps made matters worse by sending signals of apparent demoralization and weakness. Each concession further reduced Palestinian awe of Israeli might, made Israel seem more vulnerable and incited irredentist dreams of annihilating it.
The result was a radicalized and mobilized Palestinian body politic. In speech and actions, via claims to the entire land of Israel and the murder of Israelis, the hope of destroying Israel acquired ever-more traction.
Thus did the muted Palestinian mood at Oslo's start in 1993 turn into the enraged ambition evident today.
Finally, it's worth quoting from Michael B. Oren's excellent recollections in today's Wall Street Journal (hopefully they'll post this article to the free OpinionJournal over the weekend):
But while Israelis may have exploited the treaty's spirit, the Palestinians flagrantly disregarded its letter.
And that for now, is the last word.
Crossposted on
IsraPundit and
SoccerDad.